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Abstract 
The 1916 Rising was, in military terms, a shambolic failure. Despite the fact that 
Britain was locked in a gruelling struggle with Germany, the Rising was still 
utterly crushed within a week. How then, in the aftermath of victory against 
Germany, did Britain fail to win the subsequent struggle with the IRA between 
1919 and 1921? This article assesses some of the key factors which played out in 
the conflict, drawing particular attention to the IRA’s focus on the RIC and the 
consequences of this and then, later, how distorted perceptions of the proximity of 
success ultimately undermined British commitment. One of the most remarkable 
features of the conflict was the widespread belief among many on the British side 
(and more than a few in the Republican camp) that the IRA was on the verge of 
total defeat when the truce was agreed in 1921. The IRA had suffered heavy 
casualties and were running low on weapons and ammunition. Yet, somehow the 
movement prevailed. This article aims to shed light on how and why that 
happened. 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
On Easter Monday, 1916, a few bemused onlookers watched as a school teacher and poet 
proclaimed an Irish Republic on the steps of the General Post Office in Dublin. Behind 
him, armed men were doing what they could to fortify the building, while elsewhere in 
the city, barricades were being thrown around other buildings seized that day. The Rising 
had begun, and it was doomed to failure.  
 
That there would be violence of any sort seemed unlikely in 1910. That a violent 
nationalist insurrection could erupt and then within just a handful of years result in three 
quarters of Ireland breaking away seemed fantasy. In contrast, a loyalist insurrection 
centred on the North appeared a much more possible outcome for much of the preamble. 
Events in Europe, however, ultimately transformed the Irish situation. That, combined 
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with the events of 1916, and even more importantly, clumsy political manoeuvring by a 
distracted British Government in the closing year of the Great War, set the stage for what 
would prove to be an uncontrollable insurgent conflict.  
 
The original plan for Easter Rising had been for more than 20,000 armed men to seize 
control of the country. The 20,000 belonged largely to the Irish Volunteers, with a 
sprinkling of others, such as the small socialist Irish Citizens Army. Hidden within the 
mass of the Volunteers was the radical seam of the Irish Republican Brotherhood, whose 
leaders were the driving forces behind the planned coup. This leadership hoped that a 
mass outbreak of violence would act as a spur for further thousands to join the ranks of 
the rebels. England, to them, was vulnerable. The Great War had already been raging for 
two exceptionally bloody years. Massively committed to the fight against Germany on 
the continent, the British would be unable to suppress a large rebellion in Ireland, or 
easily take back control of the country once lost. Or, at least, so the IRB leaders thought. 
To succeed, however, the plan depended on a variety of factors, not the least of which 
was the arrival of 20,000 rifles and ammunition from Germany. The ship carrying the 
weapons, however, was intercepted at sea by the British, and on hearing this news, the 
rebel leadership divided. Most judged that an insurrection was now hopeless. A hard-line 
minority dominated by the IRB wanted to push ahead regardless. Contradictory orders 
were sent out to both cancel and continue the Rising. In the end, instead of 20,000 taking 
co-ordinated action throughout the country, perhaps 1,200 took to the streets of Dublin.1   
 
In the week of fighting which followed, about 1,600 were killed or injured and enormous 
destruction was inflicted on parts of inner-city Dublin. Most of the dead were civilians 
caught in the cross-fire, and when the rebels finally surrendered to the British Army, they 
were jeered and booed by Dubliners who, at least initially, blamed them entirely for the 
suffering and damage.2 
 
This then was the unpromising prequel to what some would come to call the Irish War of 
Independence, and others, the Anglo-Irish Conflict. The week of fighting in Dublin 
would be followed by 30 months of relative peace and quiet (albeit with serious tension 
beneath the surface). It might have stayed that way for much longer if the British 
authorities had handled things differently. The first mistake happened quickly: while fires 
still smouldered from the fighting in Dublin, the authorities began executing captured 
men. Over a three week period, 15 were killed in staggered executions. As the days 
passed, and newspapers carried the reports of the latest deaths, the national mood 
perceptibly changed. Yes, the rebels had been blamed for the destruction of Dublin, but 
there was something sinister and very chilling about the steady stream of official murders 
in reprisal. “It was like watching a stream of blood” one woman would later write, 
“coming from under a closed door.”3 The pointless execution of Roger Casement by 
hanging a few months later, served to only deepen sympathy for the survivors, most of 
whom would shortly be released from internment camps.   
 
British government mishandling and misjudgement of the general mood in southern 
Ireland, ultimately turned a military fiasco into the foundation for a formidable 
insurgency. The executions in 1916, were followed in 1917 by the hunger strike and 
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death in prison of Thomas Ashe, who was buried with an emotional show of force by the 
Volunteers. At the same time, public anger was rising due to growing food shortages, the 
result of too much being exported to England, a policy which brought with it dangerously 
emotive echoes of 1847 and famine. The decisive factor though proved to be the 
Conscription crisis in 1918, when the government seriously toyed with the idea of 
introducing conscription in Ireland. This was an enormous error. Though eventually the 
government shied away from the policy, that it had come so close cemented public 
support around a now utterly transformed Sinn Fein and set the scene for a very different 
type of conflict to emerge in 1919. 
 
 
Out of the Ashes …    
 
The forces which had attempted the Rising in 1916, had by 1919 evolved into quite a 
different animal. From early 1919 onwards, the Volunteers were increasingly referred to 
by the media and public as the Irish Republican Army (IRA).4 The name stuck, but it 
would be a mistake to argue that the IRA possessed a clear strategy for the conflict which 
was smouldering slowly alight in Ireland in 1919. They did not.5 Indeed, beyond a 
pragmatic principle that a massed uprising with fixed defences was to be avoided at all 
costs – the painful lesson of Easter 1916 – the IRA campaign would prove to be a 
constant work in progress, adapting to circumstances and resources, but gradually gaining 
in both intensity and sophistication. At the start of 1919, IRA leaders writing in the 
movement’s newsletter, An tÓglach, sketched the outline of a strategy in only broad 
strokes: 
 
England must be given the choice between evacuating this country and holding it 
by a foreign garrison with a perpetual state of war in existence. She must be made 
to realise that that state of war is not healthy for her. The agents of England in this 
country must be made to realise that their occupation is not a healthy one. All 
those engaged in carrying on the English administration in this country must be 
made to realise that it is not safe for them to try to "carry on" in opposition to the 
Irish Republican Government and the declared wishes of the people. In particular, 
any policeman, soldier, judge, warder, or official, from the English Lord 
Lieutenant downwards, must be made to understand that it is not wise for him to 
distinguish himself by undue "zeal" in the service of England in Ireland, nor in his 
opposition to the Irish Republic.6 
 
The result in practice would largely boil down to terrorism in the cities and large towns 
and at times a guerrilla war of movement in the countryside. By the time a truce was 
declared in July 1921, the death toll from the conflict – perhaps 1,400 killed – still paled 
in comparison to the dreadful slaughter of the Great War which preceded it. The killing 
was spread over a 30 month period, though most of the deaths actually happened in the 
final year of fighting.7 Of those killed, about 624 were members of the security forces, 
552 were members of the IRA and about 200 or so were civilians.8 The low overall tally 
of civilian deaths is perhaps the biggest surprise, compared not only to the violence of the 
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1916 Rising, but also with what would later happen in Northern Ireland in the closing 
decades of the century. 
 
In their approach to the conflict, the IRA leadership drew its inspiration from an eclectic 
range of sources. The failure of the 1916 Rising left an abhorrence for any approach 
based on a mass uprising, but beyond that, it was not at all clear in 1919 what direction 
the conflict would take. IRA theorists were certainly deeply impressed by the 
achievements of the German commander von Lettow-Vorbeck, who with a force of only 
a few thousand men tied down over 100,000 Allied troops in east Africa and forced the 
British to invest extravagant resources in ultimately doomed efforts to bring the Germans 
to heel.9 At war’s end, von Lettow-Vorbeck was still at large, planning his next offensive, 
and received a hero’s welcome on his eventual return to Germany. 
 
From an Irish perspective there were two key elements to note from von Lettow-
Vorbeck’s campaign.10 The first, and perhaps this was the crucial one, was that the 
enemy had been the British. Fighting the same opposition just a year later, there was no 
doubt considerable propaganda and morale value in highlighting the frustration the 
British had experienced in East Africa. Second, was the principle that von Lettow-
Vorbeck’s strategy from the start had been to avoid defeat. He fought only when the odds 
looked particularly good, the rest of the time he focused on simply keeping his forces 
away from the enemy and forcing them to chase. He travelled light and deliberately 
selected difficult terrain to go through, which would exhaust and wear down his pursuers. 
He effectively turned the conflict into a painful long-distance marathon, where as long as 
he was not caught, he could deny the British victory. 
 
Ireland, however, did not offer the vast expanse of East Africa (one that was almost 
devoid of roads or railways) and while the IRA’s flying columns in particular would try 
to emulate some of the spirit of that campaign, such approaches really only stood a 
serious chance in the more rugged parts of Munster and Connaught. The urban campaigns 
inevitably took on a very different feel. 
 
 
Targeting Policing In Ireland 
 
In assessing the fundamentals of the IRA’s overall strategy – and bearing in mind its 
evolving nature – some core elements emerge. First, the military campaign was 
particularly focused on the police as the primary target, rather than the British Army, and 
this focus was arguably the crucial factor in the IRA’s overall success.  
 
There were two significant police forces active in the country in 1919. The Dublin 
Metropolitan Police (DMP) were responsible for policing in Dublin City and County, and 
had a strength of 1200. Significantly, the DMP also housed G Division. This was the lead 
unit for gathering and co-ordinating intelligence on the IRA. Though its role was 
absolutely vital, it was chronically understaffed with just 10 officers. Even worse it was 
fatally compromised by the fact that three of these officers were strongly sympathetic to 
5 
 
the IRA, and were independently passing a steady stream of intelligence to the IRA about 
the activities and information of the section.  
 
While the DMP possessed 10 percent of the police strength in Ireland at the start of the 
conflict, they would suffer very few casualties in the ensuing 30 months of violence, just 
11 officers killed. This represented only 2.5 percent of police fatalities in the conflict.11 
The IRA recognised from the beginning that most members of the DMP were anti-British 
in outlook, and strongly apathetic about enforcing actions against the IRA.12 A deliberate 
policy was introduced then to avoid attacking and killing DMP officers. An exception 
however was made for active officers in G Division who ignored warnings from the IRA 
to curb their “zeal”. Such men were targeted heavily, especially in the opening stage of 
the conflict. While only 15 police officers were killed in the country in 1919, five of these 
were DMP officers, mainly detectives connected to G Division. Another five were killed 
in 1920, again with active detectives being singled out.  
 
The DMP’s apathetic stance to the conflict was well recognised by other parts of the 
British security forces, with the head of the British Army in Ireland warning the 
government in August 1920 that “The Dublin Metropolitan Police are, in my opinion, 
quite past redemption” and that soldiers were needed to perform any effective anti-IRA 
policing operations in the city.13 
 
The situation with regard to the other major police force in the country was different. The 
Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC) was the primary police force in Ireland and was 
responsible for everywhere apart from Dublin.14 In 1919, the force had just over 9000 
officers, but was below its normal compliment of about 10,000. These men were thinly 
spread throughout the country in a total of 1299 barracks. A few of the larger city 
barracks could have close to a 100 officers stationed with them, but the vast majority 
were far smaller, and most rural barracks were very simple affairs with only 5 officers 
manning them.15 As the violence escalated these barracks would be a major target for 
IRA attacks and the smaller bases in particular would prove to be highly vulnerable.  
 
While the IRA followed a largely hands off approach with regard to the DMP, this did 
not apply to the RIC. It is worth, however, noting the slow build up in violence. In the 
first year, just 15 police officers were killed in total, and for the only time, the larger RIC 
actually suffered proportionally less at this stage than the DMP. 
 
There was however a sustained campaign of intimidation against the RIC. This 
encouraged many officers to resign or retire, and it also seriously deterred local recruits 
from joining the force. In order to make up the shortfall – and also to meet targets to 
expand the force as the conflict continued – large numbers of recruits from Britain would 
ultimately be brought in, radically changing the character and outlook of the force, and 
intensifying the conflict between it and the IRA. Indeed, if there was a central core to the 
IRA’s strategy in the conflict, it was that the primary enemy in the field was the RIC and 
that victory or defeat lay in destroying the RIC’s ability to operate amid, and integrate 
with, local communities.  
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Statistics kept by the authorities suggested that the RIC were the direct targets of about 
18 percent of IRA ‘incidents’.16 This might suggest that the IRA’s primary focus may 
have lain elsewhere, but a more accurate sense of the IRA’s priorities can be seen in 
figure 1 which describes the deaths suffered by the security forces in Ireland. While 
attacks against military targets did increase to reflect the growing role played by the 
British Army as the conflict progressed, overall most of the casualties suffered by the 
security forces were police officers.17 Not only were they the targets of serious violence, 
they were also the targets of systematic campaigns of intimidation and ostracism. The 
intent of these was to isolate the police from local communities and to have the force 
increasingly seen as an occupying security organisation. In many parts of the country 
family members and friends of police officers were attacked and in a few cases killed. 
Locals who worked in any capacity to support the police were harassed and threatened.18 
Women who associated with police officers were assaulted and had their hair cut off. 
Shopkeepers refused to serve police officers and their families. In Church, people refused 
to sit on the same aisles as RIC men and their families. “Join the RAF and See The 
World. Join the RIC and See the Next” proclaimed graffiti daubed on street walls.19 
 
 
Figure 1: Security Personnel Killed in Ireland, 1919 – July 11th, 1921 
Statistics drawn from: Abbott (2000) and http://www.cairogang.com/soldiers‐
killed/CAUSE_OF_DEATH/KIA/killed‐in‐action.html 
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The result was that recruitment to the police force within most of Ireland collapsed, while 
resignations massively increased.20 The force lost a very large proportion of its native 
officers, and with them their strong local links and knowledge. The shortfall was only 
made up by recruiting thousands of men from Britain, primarily ex-military who had 
been demobilised after the Great War, almost all of whom were Protestant, and most of 
whom came from large British towns and cities.21 The police transformed from an 
organisation whose members broadly reflected the demographics of local communities, 
to one which was increasingly alien. In background, temperament and religion, the 
officers were increasingly poorly placed to connect effectively with the population and 
environment around them. All of which inevitably fed into the IRA’s narrative that the 
police were a foreign force of occupation. 
 
In June 1920, the pages of An tÓglach provided not only a rationale for why the RIC 
were targeted by the IRA, but also what in retrospective proved to be a generally accurate 
assessment of the state the RIC had been reduced to by that stage: 
 
[The enemy’s] front line in Ireland, his chief instrument of executive power was 
the "R.I.C.” an armed force of Irish mercenaries with elaborate local knowledge, 
situated in strongholds in every part of the country, even the wildest and remotest. 
The “R.I.C." were his eyes and ears and his strong right arm in Ireland. A 
relatively small body of men as compared to the people of Ireland; they were able 
by their organisation and elaborate system of intelligence to dominate the 
unarmed citizens. … To-day the first line of the enemy, the chief instrument of 
executive power has broken down and ceased to be effective. The "R.I.C." have 
been driven from their outposts, nearly five hundred of their strongholds have 
been evacuated and destroyed, and they have been forced to concentrate only in 
certain strong centres, where, in some parts of the country they are in the position 
of beleaguered garrisons. They are no longer effective for the purpose for which 
they were intended. … Demoralisation has set in their ranks. …There are lists of 
resignations from the force daily, and the effort of the enemy to fill up the gaps by 
English recruits is a confession of failure. The English recruits will not be 
effective for the purpose for which the "R.I.C." were established. … English 
soldiers have not the local knowledge of the Irish "constables"; … They are not 
likely to succeed where the "R.I.C." failed.22  
 
The RIC had indeed abandoned many outposts. IRA attacks against vulnerable barracks 
swiftly led to a policy of abandoning the smaller, rural bases. By the beginning of 1921, 
452 police barracks had been closed across the country (over a third of the total number 
occupied in 1919). This effectively abandoned large parts of the country – primarily rural 
areas – to IRA dominance.  
 
The remaining barracks were target hardened and in some cases ex-military men were 
hired as ‘Defence of Barracks Sergeants’ with the specialised task of making security 
preparations and taking command should the building come under attack. Police officers 
who had previously manned the abandoned barracks were now crowded into the 
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surviving ones. The result was that by 1921, the typical barracks was much better 
protected and heavily manned than in 1919, but this had come at the cost of relinquishing 
a permanent police presence in much of the country. Even so, IRA attacks against 
barracks continued, with 38 manned barracks being attacked in the last four weeks before 
the Truce, though none of these were overrun.23 
 
 
Assessing British Strategy in the Conflict 
 
At a political level, the British approach to the conflict was hamstrung from the start by 
the Home Rule Act of 1914. This was supposed to come into effect in 1920 and it 
promised Ireland a considerable measure of independence from London. In 1914, John 
Redmond’s nationalist but moderate Irish Parliamentary Party (IPP) dominated the Irish 
political scene and looked certain to dominate any new Home Rule institutions. By 1918, 
that had utterly changed. In the aftermath of the Easter Rising, the conscription crisis in 
1918 and the other storms which had played over the Irish political landscape, support for 
the IPP evaporated. In the December 1918 General Election, the IPP went from holding 
74 seats to holding just six, and some of these they only won because Sinn Fein agreed 
not to run against them in particular constituencies (in order to prevent Unionist 
politicians taking the seat). Sinn Fein, a tiny peripheral party a few years previously, won 
by a landslide, taking 77 seats. Unionist politicians won twenty-six.24 The British 
government baulked at the prospect of handing control over to men who had staged a 
violent uprising just two years previously, but then dithered aimlessly in slow moving 
efforts to replace the Home Rule Act with something more palatable.  
 
Work started on the Government of Ireland Bill 1919, which was introduced in December 
1919 primarily to fend off having to surrender control a few months later in 1920 as 
originally legislated. It took nearly another year for the Bill to become law, by which 
stage events on the ground in Ireland had deteriorated drastically, and the Act was largely 
irrelevant. At heart, however, having conceded the principles of Home Rule, some form 
of separation was inevitable. This meant that the British found themselves in the hazy 
position of fighting, not to keep Ireland firmly in the United Kingdom, but rather to try to 
determine who would govern after they left.25 This was a desperately unpromising 
position and it helps explain the roots behind much of the flawed policy and strategy 
Britain followed. 
 
A second issue worth bearing in mind, is that the British political leadership were 
distracted by other priorities, especially in the first 18 months of the conflict which saw 
only a slow growth of violence in Ireland, but a steadily deepening mobilisation of 
support for the IRA, and intensifying alienation toward the security forces. The aftermath 
of the Great War and the Peace negotiations in Paris galvanised interest and attention. 
The corridors of power in Whitehall regarded Ireland as an always troublesome issue, 
understood it poorly, gave it minimal attention, and assumed for too long that it could be 
resolved satisfactorily at a later point.  
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Added to this, the British military was stretched very thinly and was embroiled in a wide 
range of conflicts across the globe. These not only competed for political attention with 
events in Ireland, but also competed very strongly for military resources. At the start of 
1919, while the British Army was still bloated from the Great War with 3.9 million men 
in uniform, there was huge pressure to rapidly deflate (not least because of the 
tremendous economic debts Britain had wracked up during the war). Wholesale 
demobilisation commenced and by 1921 the army had shrunk to just 250,000.26 Nearly 
two thirds of this force were scattered overseas in an eclectic mix of countries and 
conflicts, ranging across Northern Europe, the Middle East, Asia, India and Africa. In 
many of these areas, the troops were in conflict with local forces. In others, they were 
heavily engaged in colonial “policing”. The demands were many, and the manpower was 
spread very thin.  
 
Ireland, in comparison, was relatively well supplied.  In 1919 there was a very substantial 
military presence in the island, some 40,000 strong.27 The police presence was 
considerably weaker, about 10,000 men, but in theory, the authorities had a security force 
of some 50,000 reasonably well trained and experienced professionals to call upon as the 
slide into conflict began. These forces would be significantly increased as the conflict 
progressed. By the time the truce was declared, the police forces had been enlarged to 
17,000 (1500 of whom belonged to the specially created Auxiliary Division composed of 
ex-military officers).28 The military garrison had also been expanded, and over the 
summer of 1921 there were plans to bring in a further 19 battalions lifting British Army 
strength to 80,000 men. Spending on the military had considerably increased going from 
£5.5 million per annum in 1919 to almost £15 million per annum by June 1921.29  
 
Civil protest had added significantly to the costs of operating in Ireland. This is perhaps 
best demonstrated by the Munitions Strike of 1920 when first dock workers and then later 
railway staff refused to off-load or transport military munitions or personnel. This caused 
not only enormous disruption to the movement of military supplies but also required the 
British to divert substantial resources and attention to the issue of transportation, adding 
considerably to the economic cost of the conflict.30 As the summer of 1921 progressed, 
costs were set to rise considerably higher again with the arrival of the 19 new battalions. 
 
 
Shifting Sands: Perceptions and Reality in the Conflict 
 
At the time the truce was declared in July 1921, perhaps surprisingly, there was a widely 
shared belief among most British Army officers that the IRA was on the verge of total 
defeat. Many of the officers believed that the IRA would have been completely crushed 
within “weeks” or at most “six months”. For these men, the government’s willingness to 
negotiate a settlement at this point was almost incomprehensible.31 This narrative came to 
dominate the post-conflict official reports compiled by the military.32 In The Record of 
the Rebellion compiled in 1922, the British Army argued that the IRA had been in a 
“desperate position” at the time of the Truce: 
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The rebel organisation throughout the country was in a precarious position …The 
flying columns and active service units … were being harried and chased from 
pillar to post, and were constantly being defeated and broken up by the Crown 
forces; individuals were being hunted down and arrested; the internment camps 
were filling up;33  
 
While a September 1921 report complained:  
 
It is small wonder that the rebel leaders grasped at the straw that was offered, and 
agreed to negotiation.34  
 
One month after the Truce had been signed, General Macready summed up well the 
general feelings within the military as to what had happened: 
  
The feelings of Officers and men under my Command at the turn events have 
taken may I think be described as somewhat mixed. The prominent features are 
feelings of humiliation, disappointment, anxiety and, at any rate in the South 
West, of scepticism. Humiliation that even in so worthy a cause as the restoration 
of peace in this distracted country, it should be necessary to discuss terms with 
men they have been taught to consider the organisers of the murders of their 
comrades; disappointment that, just as it appeared possible that firm and decisive 
steps in dealing with the situation were about to be initiated, those responsible for 
the orgy of outrage of the past eighteen months should escape their just 
punishment; anxiety lest the snowball of concession should develop into an 
avalanche - and scepticism as regards the ability of the leaders of the I.R.A, to 
control their more militant followers.35 
 
Yet deeper examination of British perceptions of the conflict reveals sometimes wild 
oscillations in opinion and at times an often schizophrenic range of views. Further, a 
curious feature of the British perceptions is how disconnected they appeared at times to 
be from the violence on the ground. Figure 1 previously showed that the level of violence 
in the country steadily increased as the conflict progressed, and had entered its most 
intense phase in the closing months. Far from painting a picture of an insurgency coming 
increasingly under control, the death tolls suggested one that was steadily growing in 
severity. 
 
This becomes even clearer in Figure 2 which outlines the average number of security 
force personnel killed per day. This does not support any argument that the IRA 
campaign in the summer of 1921 was being contained or was faltering. On the contrary, 
Ireland was clearly becoming a more dangerous place for members of the Crown forces 
in the closing six months of the conflict. What would have happened had the truce not 
occurred in July is a rich source of speculation, but any objective assessment of figure 2 
does not support the view that the IRA was on the point of collapse or that the British 
were on the verge of a dramatic improvement in fortunes. If anything, the statistics point 
towards an increasing deterioration in the situation from the British point of view.  
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Figure 2: Average Number of Security Force Personnel Killed Per Day, 1919 – 11th 
July 1921 
 
 
 
While the rhetoric of having the IRA on the defensive dominates most accounts from the 
closing 12 months, some indirect recognition of the general statistics can be felt with 
regard to claims that the IRA have been forced to change tactics and could no longer 
attack targets in the same manner as before. A repeated claim in these accounts is that the 
IRA switched to attacking individual off-duty soldiers and policemen, who were highly 
vulnerable.  
 
However, figure 3 questions how realistic this overall argument was. The data for figure 
3 was drawn from an analysis of the accounts of police fatalities compiled by Richard 
Abbott.36 Through an exhaustive review of official records and media reports, Abbott was 
able to document the deaths of officers in the conflict, and his research provides the most 
authoritative account of police fatalities. The accounts of each death provided by Abbott 
were analysed for this study to establish the context of the death, and particularly whether 
other members of the security forces were present when officers were attacked.  
 
The analysis shows that attacks against isolated police officers had generally always been 
a feature of the conflict. However, figure 3 suggests that in percentage terms the peak 
period for lethal attacks against lone police officers, had actually been at the end of 1919 
and start of 1920. The final 12 months of violence showed a lower overall percentage of 
such attacks. There was a very slight but steady increase in deaths from such attacks in 
the closing year, but this was an increase of just 6 percent compared to the summer of 
1920, and does not reflect a profound change in IRA tactics in this area as is sometimes 
argued.    
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Figure 3: Percentage of Lethal police attacks against lone targets, 1919 – July 11th 1921 
 
Much of the debate on the performance of the British security forces in the conflict has 
been dominated in recent years by the perception of the military and to a much lesser 
extent the police, that they were betrayed by Westminster politicians who did not back 
them strongly enough, and caved in to the IRA just as a British victory was about to be 
achieved.37  
 
In defence of the politicians, however, the statistics of the conflict were not supporting 
the military men’s view. In 1921 the Cabinet was receiving weekly casualty reports on 
Ireland, which showed that fatalities at the hands of the IRA were steadily rising and not 
declining. The economic cost of the conflict was also soaring and set to get much higher. 
Perhaps more damaging, the promising statements and perceptions about the progress of 
the conflict made towards the end of 1920 and early part of 1921, had proved to be 
mirages, and only harbingers for far tougher times.  
 
An indication of the general positive perceptions of the conflict’s progress, can be seen in 
for example Captain R.D. Jeune’s account of a conversation with General Boyd, the 
military commander of Dublin in January 1921. Jeune was one of the few British 
Intelligence Officers to survive the Bloody Sunday attacks in November 1920, but 
despite that experience he still felt that the IRA were being defeated: 
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[Boyd] said ‘Well Jeune, I think we have broken the back of the movement now, 
don`t you?’ I replied ‘Yes, sir, and I think six months should see it out’, to which 
he answered ‘Yes, I think you are right. Hamar Greenwood (then Colonial 
Secretary, and in charge of Irish affairs) says two months, but I think that is rather 
optimistic’38 
 
Such optimistic appraisals within the ranks were also transmitted to the politicians. At a 
meeting in Downing Street on December 29th 1920, the Prime Minster had asked bluntly 
how long more would it be until Sinn Fein and the IRA were “entirely broken”? Four 
months was the agreed opinion of three of the senior Generals present – provided, they 
added, that the government did not agree a truce with the IRA in the interim.39 By the 
start of May, then, the IRA would be broken and the government could impose a 
settlement.   
 
Yet, when May arrived the IRA was patently not broken. Indeed, in that month the IRA 
killed more members of the security forces than in any of the preceding months of the 
entire conflict. 
 
If that was not bad enough, also raised at the December meeting was the question of the 
likely outcome of any election held in Ireland in 1921. General Macready replied if an 
election was held before March there would be a general boycott imposed by the IRA in 
the South of Ireland. In a telling response to this news, the Prime Minister quipped that 
“if Michael Collins could stop three million people using their vote, it did not say much 
for the success of the policy His Majesty's Government was now pursuing.”40 The Prime 
Minister was then told that after four months the IRA would no longer be strong enough 
to terrorise the population into doing their will at a general election. 
 
The election was set for May, five months later. Sinn Fein did not boycott, instead they 
won a landslide victory. Reporting on this in May, General Macready bleakly reported to 
the Cabinet: 
 
In all constituents in Southern Ireland, except Dublin University, Sinn Fein has 
had a complete "walk-over", not one single Unionist, nationalist or Labour 
Candidate being even nominated for any of the remaining 124 seats. There are 
only two conclusions to be drawn from these results. Either the people of 
Southern Ireland are solidly republican and support and approve of the Dail 
Eireann's policy of murder, outrage and boycott, or the gunmen have so terrorized 
their fellow countrymen that no one dare nominate or support an individual whose 
views are other than republican. Sinn Fein would have the world believe that the 
former is the correct conclusion, and that Southern Ireland is unanimously 
republican. This is not the case, though it is probable that Sinn Fein would have 
obtained a substantial majority had the Elections been contested41 
  
Doubtless, the Prime Minister must have increasingly felt that events were continuing to 
“not say much for the success of the policy His Majesty's Government was now 
pursuing.” The military men would later argue they had been betrayed by the politicians 
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but the politicians could certainly be forgiven for having lost faith in any positive 
assessments that the military and security men offered.  
 
In reports towards the end of 1920 and beginning of 1921, the Cabinet were repeatedly 
told that the morale and spirit of British troops in Ireland was good, albeit contained with 
the reports were warnings that all was not well in the regard. In July, General Macready 
noted that “the number of desertions and applications for discharge are heavy, which 
indicates that service in this country is not popular.”42 By November, Macready’s “not 
popular”, became Churchill’s “intensely unpopular”, when he wrote to the Cabinet that: 
 
…there is no doubt that service in Ireland is intensely unpopular [with British 
forces]. I have repeated requests from officers of middle and senior rank to be 
allowed to retire or to be transferred. When a post is vacant in Ireland, sometimes 
six or seven officers refuse it in turn.43 
 
This downward turn continued, and reached alarming depths in a report to the Cabinet in 
May 1921. Serious doubt was also finding its way by then into the most senior military 
leadership. This can be clearly seen in the surprisingly bleak views provided by the 
military leaders regarding the planned Autumn campaign of 1921. Great hopes had been 
built that a major injection of reinforcements would facilitate a decisive campaign in 
these months which could deal a crippling blow to the IRA. As preparations for the 
campaign were made, however, both Macready and General Henry Wilson, Chief of the 
Imperial General Staff, attempted to dampen expectations of what might be achieved. 
Their assessment began with a truly sobering account of the military situation as it stood 
then. As outlined first by Macready: 
 
…I understand that you wish to be informed as to my candid opinion in regard to 
the morale and feelings of the troops at present stationed in Ireland. …While, as I 
have said, I am of opinion that the troops at present in Ireland may be depended 
on to continue to do their best under present circumstances through this summer, I 
am convinced that by October, unless a peaceful solution has been reached, it will 
not be safe to ask the troops to continue there another winter under the conditions 
which obtained during the last. Not only the men for the sake of their morale and 
training should be removed out of the Irish "atmosphere," but by that time there 
will be many officers who although they may not confess it, will, in my opinion, 
be quite unfit to continue to serve in Ireland without a release for a very 
considerable period. To sum up, it amounts to this. Unless I am entirely mistaken, 
the present state of affairs in Ireland, so far as regards the troops serving there, 
must be brought to a conclusion by October, or steps must be taken to relieve 
practically the whole of the troops together with the great majority of the 
commanders and their staffs. I am quite aware that troops do not exist to do this, 
but this does not alter in any way the opinion that I have formed in regard to the 
officers and men for whom I am responsible.44 
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General Wilson added in his report that he agreed with this dire assessment. The Cabinet 
were thus faced with the two most senior military commanders involved now telling them 
that the conflict had to be resolved within five months or disaster loomed.  
 
True, the Cabinet had authorised reinforcements to Ireland which were now being 
assembled. This represented almost everything possible that could be sent – 19 Brigades 
– bringing the total strength up to nearly 80,000 men (and another 17,000 available in the 
different police forces). But the Generals were keen to dodge promising success, with 
Macready warning: 
 
If the Government decide to place at my disposal all possible troops and material, 
every effort will be made to stamp out the extremists while the fine weather lasts, 
that is up to the end of September, but I am not prepared to guarantee that this 
object will be attained …45 
 
This hardly enthusiastic assessment was backed up Wilson, who warned the cabinet: 
“Neither General Macready nor I can promise any definite result”.46 Given such 
assessments, not surprisingly the Secretary of State for War, Sir Laming Worthington-
Evans, was less than enthused about the prospects, and warned his Cabinet colleagues: 
 
The position of the military forces in Ireland is anything but satisfactory. There is 
a risk that a position of virtual stalemate may continue throughout the summer 
and autumn and that winter will be a time of decisive advantage to the rebels. 
Officers and men have had little or no rest—there is no back area into which they 
can be withdrawn. ... I am anxious, therefore, to reinforce the troops in Ireland 
with everything not actually required elsewhere, so that an endeavour should be 
made to break the back of the rebellion during the three months, July, August and 
September. … I am strongly impressed by the advice of my military advisers that 
there is grave risk of failure …47 
 
The day after this warning was circulated, the IRA carried out the Customs House attack 
in Dublin. Some 130 members of the IRA raided this huge building which was the 
administrative centre of British government in Ireland and also the primary location for 
all Irish tax records. They seized control of the building and set it ablaze.48 Large parts of 
the building were destroyed but nearly 90 IRA members were killed, captured or 
wounded before they could escape. Like the Tet Offensive in Vietnam, the attack was 
technically a military disaster but was nevertheless a spectacular propaganda success. It 
created yet another powerful impression that the IRA were far from beaten in the conflict 
and indeed actually looked like they were getting stronger.  
 
Adding to the increasingly grim expectations were the reports of other senior military 
officers who visited Ireland in the early summer of 1921 and came away shocked by what 
they found. It is worth quoting the report of Colonel Sir Hugh Elles which was forwarded 
to the Cabinet in June 1921: 
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I found the real situation so much more serious that I imagine there must be very 
few officers, even at the War Office, who really know what the state of affairs is. 
The British Army in Ireland is besieged. … the facts are that responsible officials 
cannot move without strong escort; money cannot be drawn from the bank 
without strong escort; despatch riders are being rapidly replaced by armoured 
cars; officers must move not only armed and in bodies, but with their revolvers 
very handy; in motor cars they carry them actually in their hands. Troops sleep in 
defended barracks—behind barbed wire. … The outlook of officers is curious. … 
I only met one man of any optimism and that was, I think, an optimism based on 
his official position. Of others, a very few were pessimistic, while the bulk were 
just fatalists. There is no evidence of morale getting low, but I thought I detected 
a great listlessness amongst all except the highly placed responsible people. 
… One thing is abundantly clear: that to proceed on the present system of 
impotent defensive, and without Martial Law rigorously exploited, is useless. If 
you pour in more troops on the present lines, you are simply throwing good 
money after bad. Four divisions now are besieged in driblets over, say, one-third 
of the country; six divisions would be besieged in exactly the same way over half 
the country. … It seems in the highest degree improbable that an autumn 
campaign will finish the trouble. … I am strongly reminded of certain phases of 
the Third Battle of Ypres.49  
 
For the politicians, only one thing was clear. It was time to make a deal. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
In combating insurgency, the failures nearly always have more to teach than the 
successes. The odds are always stacked against the insurgents. They are almost always 
vastly outmatched by their opponents in terms of resources and manpower, so their 
eventual defeat is hardly surprising. When they win, however, it is worth sitting up and 
paying very close attention indeed.  
 
Most modern historians of the IRA argue that by July 1921 the IRA were looking 
increasingly shaky, especially in Dublin. They had suffered heavy casualties, particularly 
when one factors in the number of prisoners in various jails and camps, and were also 
running low on weapons and ammunition. That said they still enjoyed enormous local 
support, had raised the killing levels to new heights, and had won the hearts and minds 
battle in the south of Ireland. The British failure to defeat the IRA is the result of a 
combination of factors, some of which have received only peripheral attention here, but 
two key issues have been drawn out.  
 
First and foremost, was the struggle between the IRA and the RIC. At the start of 1919, 
the RIC was the most potent threat the IRA faced, and the Republicans knew this. This is 
perhaps best illustrated after the conflict, in a conversation in 1922 between an RIC 
officer and an IRA commander who told him: 
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… if we hadn’t dealt with the R.I.C., there would have been no Free State. We 
weren’t afraid of the army. We could always fool them, but your fellows had the 
most marvellous local knowledge, which was too much for us.50 
 
Direct violence, harassment and intimidation mutated the RIC, so that by mid-1920 the 
organisation’s real value in the struggle had largely been destroyed. The decline in the 
RIC’s effectiveness correlated with increasing violence in the country, and increasing 
casualties among the security forces. 
 
While the security forces did enjoy some successes, and the IRA never overcame 
satisfactorily some problems (such as the shortage of weapons and ammunition), the 
scene was set for the second factor considered in detail here: the expectations of military 
and political leaders regarding the outcome and direction of the conflict. Persistent 
optimism in some quarters, and unrealistic assessments of the IRA’s ability to not simply 
continue but to actually increase the level of violence, created false dawns regarding the 
likely resolution of the conflict. These, as much as anything else, inevitably sapped 
confidence that the conflict was winnable, and made a negotiated settlement increasingly 
the only realistic and appropriate avenue for the political leaders. The subsequent British 
Army narrative of betrayal at the hands of the politicians was disingenuous and failed to 
recognise the role that the military’s faulty assessments played in the political decision-
making and expectations. It glossed over, too, the failure to properly analyse the 
seriousness and growth of IRA violence, which was too often dismissed as being in 
decline or on the point of near complete rout.   
 
What then are the key lessons to take away from the conflict? At a fundamental level, the 
conflict demonstrates the importance of psychology. The key factor proved to be the 
British government’s belief that the IRA could be defeated, and that the mass of the 
population were not genuine supporters of Sinn Fein. In this framework, if the IRA could 
be broken this would clear the space for moderate nationalists to reassert their dominance 
of the Irish political space and for the British to then dictate a more acceptable form of 
Home Rule with much more acceptable Irish politicians.  
 
 It was, however, a deeply flawed framework built on a poor understanding of Ireland, the 
IRA and the progress of the conflict. In the end, the IRA’s success ultimately boiled 
down to its achievement in destroying the state’s confidence in this framework. By the 
summer of 1921, the British government no longer believed that victory was possible 
with the resources committed and en-route, or within acceptable timescales. Wars are 
won when one side breaks the will of the other to fight on. This the IRA achieved.  
 
And yet, it could all have been very different. Had the British exercised restraint after the 
Rising, and imposed long prison sentences rather than firing squads on the captured 
leaders, the public mood regarding the Rising would have been very different. Added to 
this, more sensitive policies with regard to food shortages in the country in 1917 and 
1918, and crucially avoiding entirely any notion of introducing conscription, would have 
produced a vastly different Ireland in 1919, one which could have followed Northern 
Ireland into a similar version of Home Rule in 1920.  
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Once the conflict started in 1919, the IRA’s heavy focus on the RIC proved to be a 
sensible strategy. By mid-1920, the RIC were a broken organisation in much of the 
country, and the influx of British recruits and the growing role of the British Army played 
into the IRA’s narrative.  
 
It might still have been possible to suppress the IRA given substantially more resources 
and time, but as Bernard Law Montgomery (future Field Marshal and victor at El 
Alamein) concluded in 1924 after his own experiences in Ireland: 
 
My own view is that to win a war of this sort you must be ruthless. …Nowadays 
public opinion precludes such methods, the nation would never allow it, and the 
politicians would lose their jobs if they sanctioned it. That being so I consider that 
Lloyd-George was really right in what he did, if we had gone on we could 
probably have squashed the rebellion as a temporary measure, but it would have 
broken out again like an ulcer the moment we removed the troops.51  
 
In the end, the British went into the struggle ill-prepared and were handicapped 
throughout by a weak understanding of the reality of both public mood on the ground and 
the IRA’s capabilities and potential. As the conflict intensified, the government’s hopes 
and expectations became increasingly divorced from reality, something that the senior 
politicians only really grasped in the closing months. Whether the military grasped this at 
all is another question. The after action assessments produced by the British Army in the 
years which followed showed that some important tactical lessons had been learned. At a 
strategic level, however, it was clear that the experience had not brought the military any 
closer to understanding what had been needed to succeed in the conflict. Such insights 
would only begin to emerge in British military doctrine in the aftermath of much later 
conflicts in the century.   
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